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“The truth is something that
trials can acknowledge, 
but not something that legal
processes are needed to
discover.” ​[1]​

“The moral consideration (…) is






All national societies tend to remember – if not glorify – their past.  National history is taught in school in order to make the young people aware of what happened to the nation in its past.  It is seen as a contribution to the creation and upholding of a national identity, in addition to such  symbols as the national flag, the national anthem and, in some cases, the national language – all of which should be treated with respect. This applies both to the distant past as well as to more recent events.

Organising days of remembrance is one way of emphasizing what happened in the past.​[3]​  In the Netherlands, a small Western European country that was occupied by Nazi Germany between 1940 and 1945, “the war” is the subject of national commemoration – on 4th of May, when a period of two minutes of silence is observed​[4]​ in commemoration of the war dead, while the day after is celebrated by many people as a national holiday.  It has been suggested by some that such celebrations tend to die out, when there are no more survivors, who have personal memories of what has happened.  That need not be necessarily so.  In the United Kingdom, for instance, to this very day, the dead of the First World War are widely commemorated on Armistice Day (1918) by people wearing paper poppies​[5]​ on their lapels, and (mainly British) schoolchildren continue to tend war graves in France and Belgium.​[6]​ 

All this refers to the glorious past.  But what about less glorious events?  In the Netherlands, which tends to glorify its World War II resistance fighters, a higher percentage of its Jewish population was killed than in any other Western European country.​[7]​   Historians have suggested that this was not only due to greater German efficiency, but also to the activities of Dutch collaborators.​[8]​
	
Such a less glorious past is of particular relevance to persons accused of having been guilty of gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. They have committed international crimes such as genocide, torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, disappearances, wanton killings, abductions, death in detention, rape, 'ethnic cleansing', robbery and ill-treatment of civilians -- practices with which we in this day and age have become well familiar.  The question of accountability for such acts arises whenever a change of regime has occurred, either because of internal political developments or by means of international intervention: Argentina, Cambodia, Chile, Guatemala, Germany after reunification, Czechoslovakia after the fall of the Communist regime, the Former Yugoslavia, South Africa after the end of apartheid, Peru, Sierra Leone  -- to name just a few.  In some cases such persons are tried by domestic courts, in other cases international criminal tribunals are established as with the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.  In other cases a process of 'lustration' is established: a system of inspection to determine whether such persons are qualified to hold official positions under the new administration.  In almost 30 countries, so-called 'truth- and reconciliation commissions' have been established.

In some of these cases, actual punishment of the culprits is at issue, while in others it is mainly the gathering of information about what has happened in the past.  In many cases, such as that of the so-called 'disappearances' in countries such as Argentina and Chile, the relatives and friends of the victims more or less knew already or have at least strong suspicions about what had happened.  The famous 'Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo' in Buenos Aires, who held their weekly silent demonstrations​[9]​, harboured little hope that they would ever see their loved ones again.  But what they and others who ask for truth-finding want, is official confirmation of what has happened: on the part of the government, the courts, other public officials or, for that matter, a truth and reconciliation commission.  Such official confirmation may take the form of financial reparations, though full financial compensation for what has happened is in itself impossible.  How could a mother who lost her son, a wife who lost her husband, be financially compensated?  

The most extensive financial reparations have been paid by the German Government to the victims of the Nazi-regime: Wiedergutmachung.​[10]​  All in all, almost DM 100 billion have been paid out to the victims and their surviving relatives.  Not all former victims were willing to accept such reparations, but what is important is that the German Government in this way acknowledged its involvement in what had happened in the period 1933-1945.  This in itself was more important than the actual size of the financial reparations.  The term Wiedergutmachung (“making good again”) deserves some special attention.  Obviously, the Nazi crimes cannot be made good again.  What has happened has happened.  As Nicholas Tavuchis, in his book about apologies, has rightly observed: “(…) an apology no matter how sincere or effective, does not and cannot undo what has been done.”​[11]​  What the post-World War II West-German government meant, by using that term, was to do its utmost to show its distancing from what had happened in the past by its willingness to pay damages to the victims and their next of kin.

A special form of recognition of guilt that has received much attention in recent years, is the offering of 'apologies' for what has happened in the past.​[12]​  This can happen in the form of an official statement by the newly created government.  Thus President Aylwin of Chile has, on behalf of the state, offered apologies to the victims of the misdeeds of the Pinochet-regime and their relatives.  The US Methodist Church, a few years ago, offered its apologies for the slaughter of more than 200 Indians in 1864 by an army unit that was commanded by a Methodist lay preacher.  The Argentine Roman Catholic Church, at the request of the Pope, had asked for forgiveness for the involvement of priests in the 'dirty war' during the military dictatorship that lasted from 1976 to 1983.  There is, however, always the problem of the extent of responsibility of today's governments for misdeeds committed by its predecessors.  Should the present United States Government be held responsible for the slaughter of the Indian tribes and should it apologize to their descendants?  Should the Clinton administration, or the Bush administration for that matter, have apologised to the people of Vietnam?   Should the Government of President Mandela have apologised to the victims of apartheid (Mandela being one of these victims himself)?  When Queen Beatrix visited Indonesia in 1995, this matter came up in public discussions in the Netherlands.  The Dutch Government was not in favour of letting her offer apologies to the people of Indonesia as had been suggested.  Apologies for what? For three hundred years of colonial domination?  The bloody subjection of Aceh by Dutch troops at the beginning of the 20th century?  The two military actions of 1947 and 1948?  It is certain that some form of symbolic action may be more effective than the offering of formal apologies. When German Chancellor Willy Brandt kneeled down in front of the monument for Jewish victims in Warsaw in 1970, it made a strong impression on many people all over the world.

A major problem when dealing with these matters is that the guilty ones are often persons who are also needed for the rebuilding of society.  They command knowledge and expertise that is hard to do without.  Sometimes, they are politically important persons who still hold important political positions and are not be willing to go before a court or commission.  Or they may hold information that they can use by way of blackmail against the new leaders.  Moreover there are such considerations as 'we have to move on', 'let bygones be bygones', 'forgive and forget', 'clear the decks'.  This explains the efforts to move from 'truth', towards 'reconciliation'.  The German sociologist Theodor Adorno has spoken in this connection of 'false reconciliation': 'The attitude that it would be proper for everything to be forgiven and forgotten by those who were wronged is expressed by the party that committed the injustice.'​[13]​





A simple way of dealing with the past is vengeance or the taking of revenge.  During the German occupation of the Netherlands, the idea of a Bijltjesdag (day of reckoning) was often discussed.  Such a process of unsystematic overall revenge was fortunately avoided, but there was something called 'Special Criminal Procedures' (Bijzondere Rechtspleging), which is nowadays looked upon with somewhat mixed feelings.  Under those procedures, the death penalty, which had not been practised in the Netherlands for a great number of years, was reintroduced and forty war criminals (thirty-five of Dutch nationality and five Germans) were actually executed.​[15]​  The death sentence of four German war criminals was commuted to life imprisonment.  Repeated calls for their release caused considerable public uproar.  It took until 1989 – that is forty-four years after the war had ended – until the last two remaining prisoners were released. 
Directly after the war, the heads of Moffenmeiden, women who had had sexual relations with German military men, were shaved and publicly exhibited.  It took until the end of the eighties before children of Dutch national-socialists dared to publish their personal post-war experiences.​[16]​  Reading such memoirs leaves one with a sense of embarrassment about the way in which innocent children of guilty parents were treated after the war.







In contrast to revenge, there are those who deny that in the past anything wrong has taken place,​[18]​ or that, if such was the case, the people of the present have anything to do with it. The most far-reaching are those that deny the existence of Nazi extermination camps (“Holocaust denial”).  Until quite recently, such thinking could be dismissed as only that held by a few neo-Nazi freaks, but one can no longer close one's eyes to such ideas, since highly respected persons such as French Abbé Pierre expressed sympathy for them.  In Germany, the expression of such ideas is a criminal offence,​[19]​ which raises of course important problems such as the limits of freedom of expression.  The case of the British historian David Irving, who lost a court case in 2000, after he had accused a fellow historian, Deborah Lipstadt, of libel is a well-known one.  She had described him as a shoddy historian who had suggested that the Holocaust had never taken place.​[20]​   There are more examples of such denial.

In Japan after the Second World War, war crimes trials were held, as in Nuremberg, by an international tribunal, entirely composed of non-Japanese, dealing with the trial of individual war criminals.  Different from post-war Germany, in Japan no official recognition of any form of 'war guilt' has been expressed.​[21]​  On the contrary, to the great irritation of other Asian countries, such as China and Korea, which had suffered strongly from Japanese atrocities during the war, Japanese leaders tended to deny any form of guilt or complicity with violations of humanitarian law during World War II.  Repeatedly, protests were lodged against the presentation of the war in Japanese schoolbooks, which apparently showed little understanding for Japanese guilt.​[22]​  This has frequently arisen in the cases of the so-called 'comfort women', about 200,000 mainly Asian women who during the Japanese occupation where forced into prostitution with Japanese military men.  The Japanese Government has apologised for this behaviour and helped to set up a private fund to compensate the women.  Most of the survivors have refused the money, saying they wanted direct compensation from the Japanese Government itself.  In January 1997, Japan's chief government spokesman was quoted by Japanese news media as saying that the Asian women sent to front-line brothels were simply trying to make money and were no different from Japanese prostitutes who were operating legally in Japan at the time.  In early 2007, the matter came up again when the United States Congress considered a draft resolution demanding a formal apology from Japan for the wartime brothels. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe denied the charges, stating that “(T)here is no evidence to prove there was coercion, nothing to support it.” The Chinese Foreign Minister, for his part, urged Japan to accept responsibility for its use of sex slaves during World War II.​[23]​ The Japanese Government did not show great eagerness to do so.

The situation in Communist East Germany, the German Democratic Republic was quite different.  There, the Nazi-past was recognised, but dealt with as if the GDR had nothing to do with it.  The communist state of peasants, workers and soldiers was founded on the ruins of the Third Reich, but any involvement with that past was systematically denied.  It looked almost as if history had started anew on 7 October 1949, when Walter Ulbricht and Otto Grotewohl began to function as party leaders in the new Soviet-dominated state.  That is also the reason why the GDR has never been involved in any kind of Wiedergutmachung.  There was nothing to compensate, as all involvement with the Nazi-past was systematically denied.

Later, after the demise of the GDR, the German situation offered another model for dealing with the past, with the opening of the Stasi (East German secret police) files.  It gave victims of the secret police the opportunity to read about what had happened to them and who the perpetrators were.​[24]​   However, there is also a danger to the extent that individual reputations can be tarnished without due process -- a danger of witch hunting and invasion of privacy.  While on the one hand, making information available should be judged positively, there is the danger of the improper use of such information.  This is especially the case, if it is accompanied by a system of 'lustration', as in the former Czechoslovakia, where former government officials were denied the right to serve in the government, because of their involvement in the criticized conduct of the prior regime, without due process.    

Ignoring the past comes close to denying it.  For example, for many years what happened during the civil war in Spain was widely ignored.  The Franco regime had of course reasons of its own not to stress the atrocities committed by its soldiers, but also after the ending of the Franco regime little was done by the Spanish Government to reveal the truth.  Only recently, stronger voices are heard to deal with that past.  An Association for the Recovery of Historic Memory was founded that is trying to create an independent truth commission and has asked the United Nations to request that Spain open its archives to help citizens to locate the bodies of family members that were killed during the civil war and dumped in mass graves by Franco’s military forces.​[25]​  A book published in April 2004 – that is sixty-fivr years after the civil war ended – called The Silent Graves by Montse Armengou and Richard Belis, compared the killings to the Holocaust and criticized Spanish politicians and journalists for paying too little attention to the killings.​[26]​  In September 2004, it was reported that the Spanish Government had decided to rebury the Republican victims of summary executions and to rehabilitate these victims “juridically and morally”.  A presidential commission was set up to deal with these matters.​[27]​.  

Other governments may, on the contrary, have political reasons to keep the past alive. For instance, the Tutsi-dominated government of Rwanda has turned places where acts of genocide occurred in 1991, such as churches, where Tutsi’s and moderate Hutu’s had fled and where they were cruelly murdered, into sites of commemoration.  Heaps of skulls and the belongings of the victims are put on display to remind the citizens of Rwanda of what happened in the past, perhaps in the hope that it thus may not happen again.





After the international tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo of 1946 it took until 1993, before a decision was reached to set up a comparable tribunal: the one on the Former Yugoslavia, followed by that on Rwanda.  Surprisingly enough, these tribunals came into being by decisions of the UN Security Council, a body whose mandate it is to look after the maintenance of international peace and security, which does not necessarily include finding ways of dealing with culprits of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.  It was mainly for political reasons that the cases of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were singled out for judgement.  There is certainly no legal reason, why human rights in these countries should be dealt with and similar events in countries such as Burundi, Cambodia, Somalia, Liberia or Zaire/Congo (to name only a few of the more notorious ones) not.  Since 1948, the International Law Commission had studied on the possibility of setting up a permanent international criminal court, but it took until 1994 for the ILC to submit a full, elaborate proposal, which led to the acceptance of the Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998, which has now set up its offices in The Hague.  Major powers, such as the United States, China, and India have refused to become parties to the Statute.   The United States has on various occasions expressed its opposition to the notion that US citizens were to be tried by the Court.​[28]​  It has put considerable pressure on other states not to extradite US citizens to the Court. This attitude is somewhat surprising, given the fact that the mandate of the Court is of a complementary nature; the Court may only act, in the absence of action by the national courts of the state concerned.   

The decision by the Security Council determined the political character of the two tribunals.  Though staffed by eminent jurists of a high moral character, certain decisions remain clearly outside its mandate, for political reasons.  So far it has appeared impossible to arrest two persons who have been indicted by the Yugoslavia Tribunal: the Serb-Bosnian leaders Radovan Karadjic and Ratko Mladic, although allied soldiers serving with the NATO-forces in Serbian Bosnia, encounter the two of them regularly.  This brings us to the general problem of peace versus justice, which has been discussed at length in the literature.​[29]​  There is a permanent fear that pursuit of criminal prosecutions could interfere with political agreements that were necessary to end, and keep ended both the fighting among combatants and the more numerous attacks on, and abuses of civilians.  This clearly diminishes the authority of the Tribunal. According to the Belgian sociologist Luc Huyse, the crucial challenge consists of finding a balance between the call for justice and the need for political prudence, '(...) or in other words, to reconcile ethical imperatives and political constraints.'​[30]​  However, this problem has by no means been resolved.  Will the pronouncements of such a tribunal be accepted?  Will it, in other words, fit the sense of justice of the population concerned?     

The strength of the international criminal tribunals is that they help to serve to individualize guilt.  However, one may pause to wonder, to what extent this is indeed an advantage, if one takes Daniel Goldhagen's thesis​[31]​ into account, who argues that most of the German people were to a greater or lesser extent involved in the extermination of the Jews. Should all Germans have been punished then?  Or only some of them?  And by whom?

One may well agree with the lowest common denominator as formulated by David Forsythe: 
“Perhaps the best that can be said of the Court in the light of the Dayton peace agreement is that once created the Court generated pressures that diplomats could not ignore.”​[32]​ 

The activities of the criminal tribunals on the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court all point in one and the same direction: present and would-be perpetrators should be aware that there may come a day of reckoning in the not so distant future.  The case of former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet shows that national courts also have become more active than in the past to prosecute such criminals.​[33]​

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

Truth and reconciliation commissions are a relatively new phenomenon.  They appear on the scene after a change of regime, when those who have been engaged in gross violations of human rights, have given up their positions of power and been replaced by another, often democratic regime.  The chairman of the South African truth and reconciliation commission, Bishop Desmond Tutu, has addressed the main function of his commission as follows:

	“So how important is it that the Commission addresses these scars?”
Bishop Tutu: ”Absolutely crucial. You see there are some people who have tried to be very facile and let bygones be bygones: they want us to have a national amnesia. And you have to keep saying to those people that to pretend that nothing happened, to not acknowledge that something horrendous did happen to them, is to victimise the victims yet again. But even more important, experience worldwide shows that if you do not deal with a dark past such as ours, effectively look the beast in the eye, that beast is not going to lie down quietly; it is going, as sure as anything, to come back and haunt you horrendously. We are saying we need to deal with this past as quickly as possible -- acknowledge that we have a disgraceful past -- then close the door on it and concentrate on the present and the future.
This is the purpose of the Commission; it is just a small part of a process in which the whole nation must be engaged.”​[34]​ 

Priscilla Hayner, who has done a major study on the subject, defines truth and reconciliation commissions as follows:

“(...) bodies set up to investigate a past history of human rights in a particular country - which can include violations by the military of other government forces or by armed opposition forces.”​[35]​ 
The main objective of such commissions is to reveal the facts of human rights violations under the previous regime.  They explicitly do not have the objective of adjudication, but of reconciliation after the facts have been revealed.  Especially the truth commissions that were set up in Chile, after the fall of the Pinochet-regime and the one in South Africa have received a great deal of attention.  Similar such commissions have operated in Argentina, Chad, El Salvador, Guatemala, and, most recently, in Peru.

The composition of such commissions requires a great deal of care, in order to avoid the impression that it has been established with certain political objectives in mind or in order to whitewash the past.  Its members must have the confidence of the public.  This may or may not be stimulated by including foreign nationals in the commission, as happened, for instance in the cases of El Salvador, Guatemala and Sierra Leone.​[36]​  Their independence must be guaranteed. Independence, that is from the government.  Therefore, José Zalaquett, who was a prominent member of the Chilean Commission, has argued that the commission should be financed by the state, not by the government: 'It is important that the government secures the necessary funds before the commission begins its work. It should not reserve the right to suspend funding.'​[37]​
 
Some of these commissions have considerable powers.  The one in South Africa had the authority to compel witnesses to appear and to hear them under oath.  It could even offer a perpetrator indemnity ('amnesty') for the human rights violations he disclosed, provided he  performed them with political motives about which is disclosed full information on who was involved, who gave the orders, what was the objective of the action, etc.  The Commission must decide whether the violation in question constituted such a political act.

The first and foremost task of the commission is to present the true facts, or rather to recognize those facts.  After all, often the true facts are already well-known among the people involved, but they ask for an official recognition.  Hayner has called this 'sanctioned fact-finding'.  She quotes the then director of Americas Watch, Juan Mendez: “Knowledge that is officially sanctioned, and thereby made ‘part of the public cognitive scene’ acquires a mysterious quality that is not there when it is ‘truth’”.​[38]​  Michelle Parlevliet has listed the following useful list of objectives to be attained by truth commissions:
	The rehabilitation of victims and the restoration of their dignity;
	The assertion of the rule of law and the building of a human rights culture;
	The legitimisation of the State and its institutions;
	The establishment of an authoritative record of the past that can prevent future manipulation and distortion;
	The creation of a so-called ‘collective memory’ that should contribute to a moral revival, and provide the basis for national unity;
	The education of the population and the deterrence of potential perpetrators.​[39]​

Not all of these objectives will be equally reached by each and every truth commission.  It would seem that the establishment of an authoritative record of the past is common to all of them.  Whether, as Parlevliet suggests, that will help to “prevent future manipulation and distortion” will depend on the particular circumstances of the case.
The recognition of the facts should help such events from occurring again in the future.  It was therefore that the report of the Argentinian National Committee on Disappeared Persons was given the title Nunca Más! (Never Again!).
  
Establishing a truth and reconciliation commission is often rather controversial.​[40]​  On the one hand, there are those who prefer a policy of 'forgiving and forgetting' and who are of the opinion that this process may be harmed by the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.  Opposite to this is the idea that true forgiveness is only possible, after the recognition of the facts.  Also the former perpetrators are, for obvious reasons, not very enthusiastic about the idea, unless of course it is accompanied by a process of amnesty, as in South Africa.  There remains always the danger that a truth and reconciliation commission will contribute to the whitewashing of the misdeeds of a previous regime.  See for example the following statement by Ntsiki Biko, widow of the slain South African anti-Apartheid activist Steve Biko):

“To me it is an insult [to be asked to testify before the South African Commission on Truth and Reconciliation], because all that is needed is to have the perpetrators taken to a proper court of justice. . . I doubt very much whether they can convince me that this Truth Commission is going to bring us reconciling: one would think of reconciling after justice, but justice must be done first.
It can never be easy. To me, really, it is just opening the wounds for nothing. Because these people are going to go to the Commission - I suppose they have applied or their names have been taken. But if they go there, are they going to tell the truth? Or are they going to lie so they will get amnesty?” ​[41]​

Another question is whether, next to members of the governing regime, the military, and the police, also members of the opposition should be called to account before a truth and reconciliation commission.  The relative success of the operation in South Africa can only be understood against the background of the towering presence of President Nelson Mandela who saw to it that the truth commission received a considerable amount of public trust.  This included his appointment of Bishop Desmond Tutu, who was seen as a man of great personal integrity as chair of the commission as well as his insistence that also the misdeeds of the African National Congress (ANC) were explicitly included in the investigation.  In neighbouring Namibia, the government of President Sam Nujoma has remained adamantly opposed to the whole idea of a truth and reconciliation commission.  As the former leader of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), which it itself was responsible for torture and disappearances during its fight for independence, he did and does not want such practices to be officially acknowledged. In contrast in South Africa, there was a powerful political consensus, created by President  Mandela, for setting up such a commission; this was obviously lacking in Namibia. 

If one wants to establish such a commission, a number of questions must be answered regarding the scope of its mandate, the time period to be covered, the question of whether its activities should be published, and the question whether the names of the culprits should be made public.​[42]​  The question must also be answered whether it should begin its activities as soon as possible after the change of regime or whether it is wiser to have some time elapse.​[43]​  In favour of starting quickly is that public attention may wane after too much time has gone by.  On the other hand, this may also be an argument to wait a little, so that emotions have cooled down and the commission can do its work in an atmosphere suitable for quiet and dispassionate analysis.

Finally, there is the important aspect of transparency of the process, which received special attention in the case of South Africa.  The South African writer, Antjie Krog, who has written a moving account of what happened at the South African truth commission, has made a powerful plea for openness of the process:





Human beings are able to commit all kinds of 'inhuman' acts.  This observation is true for all times and for all places.​[45]​  What we like to call 'humanitarian' is a thin layer of civilization, which is ruptured time and again.  The atrocities committed by the German Nazis and their accomplices and the ethnic cleansing operations in Former Yugoslavia serve to demonstrate that the observation applies also to the western world as well.  These are violations of international rules of human rights and humanitarian law.  Fortunately enough, after a longer or shorter period the violations always come to an end.  Then the question must be faced: what next?  How does one find a proper balance between the call for justice and political prudence? One thing is clear: most of the victims, their relatives and survivors, consider revelation of what has really happened of the utmost importance.  This fact contains an assignment to society: to chart the past as well as possible and give it official recognition.

Two of the approaches discussed must, for obvious reasons, be rejected out of hand: acts of revenge and denial of the past: vengeance is uncontrollable, violates the rule of law and holds no guarantee whatever that the guilty will be punished or the truth revealed.  The same is true of denying the past.  Offering financial reparation or other forms of compensation are at least gestures towards the victims and their relatives, and thus an official recognition of the past, which therefore is of great importance. It need not necessarily contribute toward revealing the past.

The latter objective can be served both by adjudication, either national or international, or by the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission.  It is difficult to say which of these should be preferred.  If adjudication according to the rules of fair trial is possible and the guilty ones can be caught and convicted, this should be preferred.  But political circumstances do not always allow this procedure.  In the absence of the proper preconditions for fair trial and in the absence of a permanent international tribunal, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission may be helpful.  It should be added, however, that it remains for the time being an open question, whether finding the 'truth' will always contribute to reconciliation. Truth finding may also reveal feelings of resentment and open old wounds.  In such cases 'truth' and 'reconciliation' do not necessarily go together.  However, in the end, one has to start finding the truth first and then see whether or not it will lead to reconciliation.  It should be clear that reconciliation is a long-term process for every society.  It has been suggested that true reconciliation requires a focus on social justice and a concern with socio-economic conditions.​[46]​ However, whether or not the process of reconciliation turns out to be successful, leaving war crimes unpunished is worse: it leaves the cycle of impunity unbroken.  The process of truth finding and truth telling may be as important as its actual outcome. 

Truth commissions tend to emphasize the role of the victims, while criminal trials focus on the perpetrators.​[47]​  The former is a quasi-judicial process, whereas the latter is a real judicial process.  In this context, it will be quite revealing to observe the further development of the process in Sierra Leone, which is one of the few countries that has experienced both a truth commission and an ad hoc criminal court.​[48]​  It may be wise to set one's sights not too high and to be satisfied with as little as one can achieve.  In this context, it fits to cite Michael Ignatieff who has described the potential achievements of a truth and reconciliation commission as follows:
“All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse. (...) The past is an argument and the function of truth commissions, like the function of honest historians, is simply to purify the argument, to narrow the range of permissible lies.”​[49]​
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